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FROM MINIMIZATION TO EXPLOITATION: RE-CONCEPTUALIZING 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM 
Marc Moore and Antoine Rebérioux * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As an area of social science, the topic known as 'corporate governance' is principally an enquiry 
into the causes and consequences of the allocation of power within large economic organizations. 
This endeavor can be regarded as socially important for two overarching reasons. First, in the 
course of their normal productive and administrative operations, economically significant 
business firms tend to produce a large quantity of norms and rules that affect their socio-
economic environment. The informal assumption by corporations of such a quasi-regulatory 
function means that they acquire the status of intermediate actors situated between the two basic 
components of a liberal politico-economic system: the State and individuals. And, secondly, 
business firms are a peculiar institutional feature of a liberal political economy due to the further 
fact that they entail the limited usurpation of the basic principle of formal equality before the 
law. This is on account of the phenomenon of 'internal' power' within bureaucratic capitalistic 
organizations, as underpinned by the basic concept of employee subordination that remains 
intrinsic to the labour relation within both the Anglo-Saxon common law and the European 
continental civil law worlds (see Fox, 1974). 
Although the term 'corporate governance' literally applies to any incorporated entity, corporate 
governance scholars tend to be primarily concerned with 'public' or listed corporate entities, 
whose securities are traded on regulated liquid investment markets and which, in consequence, 
exhibit the institutional characteristic known popularly as 'the separation of ownership and 
control'. Berle and Means (1932) were first to portray how the growing importance of listed 
companies leads to a concentration of quasi-governmental decision-making power within firms, 
as disparate securities holders sacrifice powers of direct control over professional (non-
proprietary) managers in favour of gaining the practical benefits of liquidity. The separation of 
ownership and control has since become the focus for company law and corporate governance 
debates within the Anglo-Saxon world for the past seven decades. 
* Marc Moore is a lecturer in law at the University of Bristol, UK, where he teaches company law and corporate 
governance. His research interests are in relation to corporate governance and financial markets. Marc is an editor of 
the legal practitioner text Tolley's Company Law, and a visiting lecturer in company law at the University of Hong 
Kong. 
Antoine Rebérioux is associate professor of economics at the University of Paris X (Nanterre) and a member of 
EconomiX, a research unit attached to the CNRS. He works on the theory of the firm and corporate governance, and 
has recently coauthored (with M. Aglietta) the book Corporate Governance Adrift : A Critique of Shareholder Value 
(2005, Edward Elgar). 
On the difference between external and internal power, see Tsuk Mitchell (2005), p.187. 
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In this article, we highlight the fact that, as a positive statement, the separation of ownership and 
control invites competing normative analyses. In particular, whereas standard economic logic 
advocates shareholder primacy and supports measures aimed at minimizing this separation - 
either through competitive (stock) market pressures or through effective 're-
entrepreneurialization' of the firm via transition to private equity control - the managerialist 
viewpoint associated with Berle and Means contrarily proposes to exploit this separation in order 
to draw out the inherently public dimension to modern corporate capitalism. It has often been 
argued that Berle and Means, in reaching this normative conclusion, ignored some basic 
elements of theoretical economics (see Tsuk Mitchell, 2005, p.209). We argue on the contrary 
that recent empirical developments (e.g. high-profile corporate scandals such as Enron and the 
2008 international banking crises) as well as evolutions in theoretical economics tend to weaken 
the validity of the standard economic doctrine of shareholder primacy, whilst at the same time 
providing fresh support to Berle and Means' original position. 
II. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardner Means published what was to become one of the most 
influential and inspirational social-scientific works of the twentieth century. The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property was concerned with the then growing economic and political 
phenomenon known as the widely-held or 'public' company. Unlike smaller closely held or 
'private' companies, these larger companies were capitalised by the investment of finances from 
the private wealth of members of the public at large. The extraordinary nature and potential of 
the public company resided in the fact that, theoretically at least, it exhibited a complete 
'separation of ownership and control'. The controlling managers of such organisations in many 
cases held a small or even negligible ownership stake in the firm. Accordingly, they derived the 
main component of their income not from returns on company shares but rather from a fixed 
salary in essentially the same vein as any other officer or employee of the company. The 
ownership of these firms, meanwhile, was increasingly becoming vested in a multitude of small-
scale individual investors, lacking both the resources and also the incentive to undertake 
effective control over the use to which management put their economic investment in the firm. 
On this basis, Berle and Means argued that "[t]he separation of ownership from control produces 
a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and 
where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappeared" (1932, 
p. 7). Berle and Means described corporate managers as "economic autocrats", whose ability in 
effect to perpetuate their own existence had promoted them to the position of "the new princes", 
assuming unchecked control over their "economic empires" (1932, p.  116). 
Furthermore, as Galbraith (1973) later noted, even to the limited extent that any shareholder was 
sufficiently disposed to intervene from time to time in the operational affairs of the companies in 
which they were invested, any action that they took or demands that they made in this regard 
were inherently irrational, given the inability of these 'outsiders' to acquire sufficient expertise to 
be able to pass informed judgment on the merits of managers' strategic decisions. Not only were 
20091 FROM MINIMIzATIoN TO EXPLOITATION 3 
shareholders physically detached from the day-to-day affairs of the business, but they were also 
excluded from what Galbraith termed the corporate "technostructure": the collective body of 
corporate officers (including senior managers themselves) who command exclusive strategic 
control over the extensive base of scientific skills and expertise underpinning the firm's ongoing 
productive operations. Galbraith believed that, in the modem corporate economy, where 
operations were increasingly technical and specialised in nature, the real power within the large 
company rested with those that possessed the relevant knowledge, rather than the wealth, that 
comprised the business, thereby excluding shareholders from the realm of effective corporate 
control. 
IlL THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY PRINCIPLE: HOW TO MINIMIZE THE 
SEPARATION 
A. THE AGENCY PERSPECTIVE 
The standard reaction to the aforementioned separation is to favour continuity between the 
ancient and the new economic orders, by advocating shareholder primacy: shareholders, because 
they provide financial capital without guarantee, should be the ultimate beneficiary of corporate 
conduct. From the end of the 1960s the contractarian Theory of the firm, which considers the 
corporation as a self-determinative 'nexus of contracts' linking together various individual input-
providers, has provided the doctrine of shareholder primacy with strong analytical support 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991).2 
The rejection of the concept of ownership, as applied to the business firm, is a standard 
assumption of this contractarian approach in law and economics (see, e.g., Farna, 1980). This 
rejection is bound to a vision of the firm as a nexus of contracts. By definition, one cannot 
possess a contract (or contracts) as one can possess a standard asset. The idea of shareholders as 
owners of the company is therefore replaced by the notion of an 'agency' relationship constituted 
in the shareholder's exclusive favour. Managers are considered to be the 'agents' of the 
shareholders, who are the 'principals': in other words, the managerial team has been 'hired' by 
the shareholders to best serve their interests. 
Shareholders are therefore not depicted as owners, but rather as 'principals'. The implications, as 
far as corporate governance is concerned, are basically the same: managers and directors should 
be accountable solely to shareholders. However, asymmetric information coupled with 
2 
 For more details, see Cheffins, 2004. 
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opportunism leads corporate executives to serve their own interests at shareholders' expense, 
which in turn gives rise to 'agency costs'. Various incentive and disciplinary mechanisms are 
then considered to help minimize the occurrence of agency costs, by aligning corporate insiders' 
(managers') interests with those of shareholders. These mechanisms generally fall into two main 
categories, which each attempt to solve the same basic governance problem but by taking 
fundamentally opposite approaches from one another. These two categories are, namely, (a) 
competitive markets; and (b) private equity. Each will now be considered in turn. 
B. THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
Having identified the separation of ownership and control, and the resultant problem of 
managerial hegemony, Berle and Means (1932) believed that the solution to this problem was to 
use formal legal constraints as a means of controlling managers' decision-making power. In this 
regard, Berle and Means' views were to become a dominant strand in the subsequent thinking of 
many 201h 
 century corporate lawyers. It has been forcefully argued, however, that by focusing 
exclusively on corporate law mechanisms as a perceived solution to the accountability deficit 
posed by the separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means ignored economic theory and 
the potential for re-invigoration of the competitive market as an effective managerial constraint.3  
One such notable critic of Berle and Means' disregard for the role of the market in corporate 
governance was Aichian (1969), who warned that "ignoring or denying the forces of open 
competitive market capitalization is.. . a fundamental error in the writing about ownership and 
control and about the modern corporate economy" (ed. 1974, p.  136). 
A distinctive feature of the aforementioned 'agency' theory of corporate governance, in 
consequence, is its contrary emphasis on the role of competitive markets in solving the economic 
distortions which stem from the separation of ownership and control. According to agency 
theory, competitive market forces are capable of aligning the dual interests of managerial 
'insiders' and shareholder 'outsiders' whilst, simultaneously, preserving the specialization of 
risk-bearing and entrepreneurial functions associated with the modern corporate form 
(Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991). The most obvious forms of market pressure acting on corporate 
managers at any point in time are competition on price and quality in the firm's primary market 
for goods and services, and also competition from potential substitutes on the managerial labour 
market (Fama, 1980). 
According to agency theorists, though, the most powerful discipline over management stems not 
from those markets, but, rather, from the market for the financial stock of companies themselves 
(Alchian, 1969). Indeed, a liquid stock market is not only valuable as a medium through which 
firms must compete with one another to raise equity capital at low cost, but, more significantly, it 
is also a necessary prelude to the effective functioning of the market for corporate control and the 
For this criticism, see e.g. the special issue (vol.26) of the Journal of Law and Economics, published in 1983. More 
recently, see e.g. Meese (2002). For more details on this issue, see Tsuk Mitchell (2005, p.212). 
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associated disciplinary device of the hostile takeover (Manne, 1965). At the same time, 
managers' interests can be theoretically aligned with those of shareholders on an ex ante basis 
through the use of incentive-remuneration devices such as executive stock options. 
Clearly, then, the doctrine of shareholder primacy relies for its effective realisation upon the 
functioning of a liquid and efficient stock market. It is at this point, though, that the agency 
perspective encounters a potential paradox. Within the contractarian theory of the firm, 
shareholders' exclusive entitlement to the company's residual wealth is ultimately justified on 
the basis of their unique capacity for diversification. This is made possible by the liquidity of 
their market equity investment and resultant detachment from micro-level governance of any 
particular firm(s). In turn, it is argued, shareholders are likely to support risky but potentially 
value-enhancing investment strategies, given their relatively low exposure to loss from 
individual firm failure. This is in contrast to other corporate participants such as employees, who 
are said to be 'over-invested' in any individual firm and thus incapable of bearing entrepreneurial 
risk at a socially efficient level (on this, see Kelly & Parkinson, 2000, pp.  114— 119). 
However, the fact that shareholder primacy is premised on the notion of supervisory detachment 
or passivity means that contractarianism must consequently provide an alternative explanation 
for how firm-specific information impacts on investor choices in the absence of any direct 
proprietary monitoring process. For this purpose, contractarianism relies heavily on the 
assumption that corporate share prices in themselves provide a credible and comprehensive 
reflection of the information that is relevant to the income-generating potential of any particular 
corporate investment. Or, at the very least, it assumes that prevailing prices will reflect all of the 
information that is currently publicly available in relation to any company, as stated by the semi-
strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) in finance theory (Fama, 
1970; Stout, 2003). However, this assertion is inherently circular absent any more thoroughgoing 
enquiry into the actual capital market pressures and institutions that effect the continuing 
production, dissemination and incorporation of information into securities prices. 
From a more empirical or institutional point of view, contractarianism's underpinning doctrine of 
'passive shareholder primacy' is therefore necessarily reliant for its effective realisation upon the 
existence of legal and other institutional mechanisms that enable the continual publication of 
credible information on finn performance for the benefit of investors. This ensures that relevant 
information is made accessible to distant investors. Moreover, those investors must be 
sufficiently rational so as to process this information effectively in making securities selection 
choices. Within a complete market-based corporate governance system, reliable information on 
the firm is obtained primarily through external 'gatekeepers', most notably financial auditors, 
securities analysts and ratings agencies. These gatekeepers are vested with the responsibility of 
verifying the honesty and relevance of financial information disclosed by the company's 
accounting reports, thereby reducing informational asymmetries between investors and insiders 
(agents in the company) so as to ensure the proper working of financial markets. On the basis of 
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this information, investors (shareholders) buy and sell securities, thus generating stock price 
movements, which in turn trigger either or all of the above market-disciplinary mechanisms. 
Moreover, once the relevance of stock prices is established, an important role is devoted to the 
board of directors. According to agency theory, the board should act as a supervisory panel 
situated between the shareholders' General Meeting and management team, thus providing an 
'internal' point of surveillance over managers in the absence of direct shareholder monitoring. In 
particular, the board should make sure that corporate insiders act according to stock market 
signals (Gordon, 2007). Insofar as this primary monitoring function of the board is concerned, 
the most important quality required of directors is their independence, in the sense of the absence 
of any conflicts of interest on their part or other potential for collusion with management.4 Board 
independence was first advocated at the beginning of the 1980s by activist shareholders in the 
United States. Across many national jurisdictions today, the presence of at least some 
independent directors on public company boards is now a standard expectation by virtue of 
corporate laws and/or stock market regulations. As a result board independence is now the 
"conventional wisdom" (Bhagat & Black, 1999), a view which is supported by the contractarian 
idea that directors are ultimately disciplined by the market for their specialist supervisory 
services, "which prices them according to their performance as referees" (Fama, 1980, p.  294). 
Thus, even in the absence of a mandatory state-imposed system of corporate disclosure 
regulation, efficient market-induced mechanisms are likely to evolve so as to ensure that: (a) 
relevant information is inculcated rapidly into corporate securities prices; and (b) managers in 
turn respond quickly to stock market signals in a manner conducive to the continuing 
advancement of the general shareholder interest. Not only are these mechanisms believed to 
represent an adequate substitute for direct one-on-one supervision by investors of individual 
firms, but they moreover enhance the quality of corporate governance by substituting the 
cumulative allocative decisions of the capital market for the necessarily limited supervisory 
competences of the individual investor (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991). It is accordingly through 
the above course of logic that the contractarian model of the corporation succeeds in establishing 
that shareholder passivity is to a significant extent compatible with an informationally efficient 
corporate securities market, in spite of the typically limited degree of direct communication that 
takes place between the financial-investment and corporate-managerial communities respectively 
on a day-to-day basis. 
' Directorial independence is usually deemed to have been compromised if the director of a company (i) is, or has 
been, a corporate executive of that company or any of its affiliates, (ii) is, or has been, employed by that company or 
any of its affiliates, (iii) is employed as an executive of another company where any of that company's executives sit 
on the board, (iv) is a large blockholder of that company, and/or (v) has a significant business relationship with that 
company or any of its affiliates. 
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C. WEAKNESSES IN THE MARKET-BASED MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Over recent years a number of empirical factors have conspired to undermine public and 
academic confidence in the reliability and efficacy of market-based mechanisms of corporate 
governance. First, there have been a series of well-publicised corporate scandals such as the 
Enron and Worldcom collapses at the turn of the 21st 
 century (see Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; 
Armour & McCahery, 2006; Bratton, 2002; Deakin & Konzelmaim, 2004) and, more recently, 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis (see Langley, 2008) and ensuing implosion of major Anglo-
American financial institutions such as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, AIG and Northern Rock. 
Such high profile episodes have together served to undermine the perceived ability of 
informational gatekeepers to ensure the effective functioning of stock market-based managerial 
monitoring devices: the former catastrophes in respect mainly of auditors and securities analysts, 
and the latter in regard to ratings agencies. 
Secondly, a number of questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of independent 
directors, especially in the wake of the above scandals. Empirical (econometric) evidence has 
cast doubt on the proposition that independent directors are prone to occasion improvements in 
firm performance (as measured by stock market value or productivity)5. Numerous explanations 
have been put forward to account for this disappointing result. In particular, it has been widely 
suggested that independent directors have a cognitive disadvantage in relation to non-
independent board members, insofar as the former group lack relevant firm-specific knowledge. 
This disadvantage, in turn, is likely to impede the ability of independent directors to supervise 
corporate actors in those instances where market signals alone are insufficient as a means of 
gauging corporate performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990, p.74.; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003 
Osterloh & Frey, 2006). 
Thirdly, the increased dependence of both US and European companies on intangible assets such 
as trust-based employment practices and internal 'know-how' sources highlights a further 
weakness in agency theory's market-based model of control6. By definition, intangible assets are 
non-physical (in that they lack any 'hard' material existence), non-financial (in that they do not 
provide any legally-constituted revenue streams), and promise uncertain future benefits. Further, 
See, e.g., the conclusion from the survey carried out by Bhagat & Black (1999): "Most studies find little 
correlation, but a number of recent studies report evidence of a negative correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors and firm peiforinance - the exact opposite of conventional wisdom" (p.942). See also the 
meta-analysis conducted by Dalton, Daily, Elistrand & Johnson (1998), 
Measurements on US data suggest that private investment in intangibles roughly equaled investment in tangibles, 
representing around 10% of domestic output (Nakamura, 2003; Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 2006). Intangibles refer 
here to spending on information and communication technologies (ICT), spending on R&D and patents, spending on 
development of brands and spending on workforce training in firm-specific capabilities and improvements in labor 
organization. 
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knowledge-based intangibles involve strong complementarities (see, e.g., Antonelli, 2001; 
OECD, 2006). Complementarities occur when the combination of two different resources (or 
inputs) yields a greater overall output than the sum of the respective outputs resulting from the 
separate use of these inputs individually 7. This means that, for a given resource, the value of 
individual contribution (the cash flows directly attributable to it) is impossible to deduce from 
the observation of the joint output. On the (standard) assumption that the market value of a 
resource equals the properly discounted sum of its expected cash flows, then complementarities 
can be said to impede the emergence of any reliable market value for that asset. For this reason, 
intangibles typically do not have any readily identifiable market value, rendering them 
impossible to price on an objective 'arm's length' basis. 
More generally, every productive process involving complementarities between resources raises 
specific problems of separability, measurement and marketability. This point was emphatically 
recognized in the seminal paper by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), with particular reference to the 
case of human resources. Alchian and Demsetz explained how "team production" occurs 
whenever overall output is greater than the sum of individual worker contributions. In such 
instances, reliable metering and monitoring of individual contributions cannot be performed on 
an ex post basis (via observation of the output) but, rather, only from an ex ante perspective (via 
direct observation of the productive process and individual workers' behaviour). This ex ante 
observation obviously implies a particular position 'inside' the business firm as a going concern 
and productive entity. For this reason, Alchian and Demsetz suggest having a supervisor within 
the firm, in the sense of a member of the team who can monitor individual contributions 'from 
the inside'. Whenever complementarities occur, the inherent difficulty of evaluating resources 
from an external perspective also lends credence to Galbraith's famous argument (see part 1, 
supra) that, in complex corporate organisations, the inevitably superior knowledge of the 
(managerial) 'insiders' places thein in a natural position of power vis-a-vis the relatively 
uninformed (shareholder) 'outsiders'. In a nutshell, the ability of outsiders (independent board 
members, distant shareholders, securities analysts, etc.) to value properly an intangible-driven 
business model is put into question, thereby undermining the alleged superiority of market-based 
mechanisms of control. 
Overall, the disappointing evidence on the performance of external gatekeepers and independent 
directors casts doubt on the capacity of market-based mechanisms to ensure the production and 
public disclosure of reliable information for the benefit of actual and potential financial 
investors, especially when intangibles are the main driver of value. Further, regardless of the 
quality of the information set used by investors in assessing relative firm performance and 
making subsequent securities selection decisions, the ability of the stock market to provide 
efficient pricing in the sense depicted by the ECMH is open to debate (Stout, 2005). Indeed, the 
Empirical literature provides for numerous examples of complementarities in the case of intangible resources. 
Regarding ICT and new work practices for example, Breshnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt (2002) observe that ICT have 
a stronger impact on productivity in firms that adopt decentralized labor organization at the same time. Regarding 
training and new work practices, different studies also provide evidence of a correlation between training efforts and 
labor reorganization, suggesting that their joint combination does improve performance (see e.g. Lynch & Black, 
1998). 
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ECMH has been the subject of increasing academic criticism over recent decades, most notably 
as a result of developments in behavioural finance. If investors habitually operate under 
conditions of bounded rationality, then the prevailing market prices of corporate securities 
cannot be relied upon to reflect accurately even that amount of information as is publicly 
available in relation to any particular firm (Shiller, 2000). Likewise, the capacity of informed 
professional investors to 'correct' the otherwise irrational activities of speculative 'noise' traders 
is open to question. Borrowing from the insights of Keynes (1936), writers such as Orléan (1999) 
and Gilson & Kraakman (2003) have demonstrated that, even where professional investors 
possess negative information in respect of any particular company, it may still be individually 
rational for such investors to trade 'with the market' where there is growing (irrational) demand 
for the relevant firm's over-priced securities. Such practices, far from correcting securities mis-. 
pricing, serve only to exacerbate the formation of speculative bubbles in stock markets, resulting 
in the breakdown of the share price mechanism as an effective managerial disciplinary 
mechanism. The dot.com and international banking crises at, respectively, the beginning and end 
of the 2000s arguably serve to confirm this pessimistic diagnosis of the informational efficiency 
of stock markets. 
In summary, the intrinsic limitations on the ability of gatekeepers and independent board 
members to provide reliable information to the market, as well as the subsequent failure of the 
market to process this information efficiently, strongly suggests that stock prices may have 
limited, and also somewhat misleading, informational content. In turn, agency theory's claim as 
to the alleged superiority of market-based mechanisms for controlling managerial decision-
making at the individual firm level can be said to lack empirical and analytical foundations, thus 
building a negative case for the promotion of non-market, law-driven or firm-specific control 
devices within mainstream corporate governance scholarship. 
In these conditions, moreover, the utility of stock options as a managerial remuneration scheme 
is unsurprisingly open to debate. An increasingly prominent view is that such devices have 
served primarily to benefit corporate insiders, in the absence of (or, worse still, to the positive 
detriment of) other corporate participant groups such as employees or even minority shareholders 
themselves. Not only have stock options been found to enable covert forms of managerial rent 
extraction by means of back-dated, 'in-the-money' or non-index-linked schemes (see Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2005; Bechuk, Fried & Walker, 2001), but they have also been regarded as a significant 
cause of moral hazard in limited liability companies given the absence of balancing 'downside' 
risks for unscrupulous or reckless executives (see Skeel, 2005; as arguably exemplified by the 
conduct of listed investment banking firms prefacing the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis). 
Concerning the market for corporate control, meanwhile, the empirical evidence is rather 
inconclusive: the extensive literature on the effects of takeovers, whilst pointing to the (positive) 
short-term implications of takeover bids in terms of market value, suggests that those operations 
do not have, on average, any positive effect on either market value or operating performance 
over the long run. Indeed, an extensive series of empirical studies actually suggests that takeover 
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bids have an overall negative impact in the above respects (see, e.g., Burkart & Panunzi, 2006; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2007). 
D. PRIVATE EQUITY AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS (LBOs) 
Doubts as to the ability of stock market-based mechanisms to ensure proper control over public 
corporations have led some law and finance scholars to consider an opposite form of governance, 
namely joint ownership and control by means of private equity (see Jensen, 1989 & 2007; Jensen 
et al, 2006; Baker & Smith, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).8 
 In its literal sense, the term 
'private equity' refers to any investment in the equity of a business where the stake of equity 
purchased is relatively large and illiquid and hence not easily tradable on a public investment 
market. The most famous sense in which private equity is known today, however, is in regard to 
leveraged buyout (or 'LBO') transactions, which typically entail the acquisition of control by one 
or more specialist financial firms over a formerly listed corporation, by means of intensive 
recourse to borrowed funds (UK Treasury Committee, 2007). From a corporate governance 
perspective, LBOs entail directly re-connecting the dual ownership and control dimensions of the 
(formerly) public corporation, whilst, at the same time, preserving one important benefit of the 
public corporation: the specialization between risk-bearing and management. However, in a 
private equity-controlled company, risk bearing does not operate through the dispersion of equity 
capital (in the form of liquid minority shareholdings) but, contrarily, through the concentration of 
equity capital in illiquid blocks coupled with the wide dispersion of liquid securitized debt (i.e. 
bonds) on the public market. 
The LBO expanded in popularity and significance throughout the 1980s to become a relatively 
mainstream practice of US corporate finance and goveinance (on this, see Baker & Smith, 1998, 
ch. 1). The initial LBO movement of the 1980s reached its zenith in 1988 following KKR' s then-
record-breaking $25 billion acquisition of the Atlanta tobacco and foods conglomerate RJR 
Nabisco (see Burrough & Helyar, 1990), although the ensuing collapse of the market for cheap 
low-quality debt securities (known as 'junk bonds') prefaced a marked reduction in large-scale 
buyout activity in the 1990s. However, the first decade of the 21St 
 century witnessed the onset of 
a larger-scale and more globalised LBO movement, against the background of buoyant equity 
markets and a (temporary) revival in the international junk bond market (Kaplan, 2007; UK FSA, 
2006). Over 2006 and 2007 alone, the world buyout record was broken three times in succession 
after the respective acquisitions by leading LBO specialists of Hospital Corporation of America 
(HCA), Equity Office Properties (EOP) and the Texan power generator and distributor TXU for 
the sums of $33 bn, $39 bn and $45 bn respectively. 
8 
 On this topic generally, see the special issue (vol. 18(3)) of the Journal ofApplied Coiporate Finance, published in 
Summer 2006. 
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Typically, an LBO will be conducted by a specially constituted 'LBO partnership', which will 
take the legal form of a limited partnership9. As such, it will comprise one or more general 
partners (GPs) together with a relatively small number of limited partners (LPs). The GP will be 
a specialist private equity (LBO) firm, such as KKR, Blackstone, Texas Pacific Group, CVC 
Capital or Permira. The LPs will usually be large institutional investors such as public or private 
sector pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts or university endowments. As the general 
partner, the LBO firm will usually have exclusive authority to manage the business of the 
partnership (i.e. the corporate buyouts) and will also be wholly liable for any debts incurred by 
the partnership. The limited partners, on the other hand (as their name suggests), are exempt 
from responsibility for the partnership's debts beyond the extent of their initial investment in its 
'buyout fund': this is a pool of equity capital advanced by the various LPs, which will be used to 
support a number of corporate buyouts over the life of the LBO partnership. 
The GP will typically identify a company that has a strong asset base and/or which generates 
high and stable cash flows, but whose widely-held ownership (and governance) structure gives 
the incumbent managers inadequate incentives to apply the extra level of effort necessary to 
maximise value. In any event, the GP will be aware that, if the LBO partnership successfully 
acquires a controlling stake in the company, it will be in a direct position to take whatever steps 
it deems necessary in order to improve the operating performance of the business and, in turn, 
the ultimate value of the firm's equity when it is returned to the public market (or else sold on to 
another private buyer) following its reorganisation'°. 
Once the GP has selected a suitable buyout target, it will then initiate its bid for control of that 
company A proportion of the LBO partnership's buyout fund will be allocated as the. equity 
component of the bid finance. This sum will then be 'leveraged' by extensive recourse to bank 
borrowings. Normally at least 70% of a target company's purchase price will be financed in the 
form of debt from third parties, with at most only 30% of that figure comprising equity from the 
buyout fund itself (Frond & Williams, 2007). As collateral for the loan(s), the GP will pledge the 
assets and/or future cash flows of the target company's business(es), which the lender(s) will 
subsequently acquire rights of security over in the event that the acquisition of the target is 
successfully completed. Lending banks will thereafter typically 'spread' their risk exposure 
amongst the investing public by issuing a large number of liquid asset-backed securities (ASBs) 
on the international debt markets. 
For a detailed explanation of the structure and functioning of LBOs, see Cheffins and Armour (2007); UK 
Treasury Committee (2007). 
10 
 Moreover, the GP will usually be placed to enjoy indirectly a significant proportion of any increase in the 
company's equity value by virtue of the 'carried interest' provision that is commonplace in LBO partnership 
agreements, whereby the OP will receive 20% of the total capital gains on investments made by each of their buyout 
funds every year. 
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Following successful completion of the LBO, the acquired corporation will typically be de-listed 
from the relevant public equity market and re-registered as a private company. The typical board 
of a private equity-controlled company will be relatively small and comprised mainly of 
representatives of the GP together with, in some cases, representatives of the largest LPs (i.e. the 
institutional investors to the buyout fund), both of whom will work closely with the firm's 
management team on an ongoing basis (Jensen et a!, 2006). In a sense then, the archetypal 
director in a private equity-controlled company is the exact opposite of the 'independent' board 
member in a public company, whose inevitable lack of direct connection with the firm arguably 
reduces his ability to monitor corporate executives robustly. In a private equity-controlled 
company, meanwhile, board meetings will almost always be presided over by an executive 
chairman, who will typically be either a senior officer or appointee of the GP itself. The presence 
of significant proprietary interests on the board theoretically makes for a more motivated and 
strategically focussed discursive form (Jensen, 2007; Jensen et a!, 2006). In this way, the 
decision-making process at board level is redesigned specifically for the purpose of 
resolving 'internal' strategic problems rather than on ensuring perfunctory 'external' 
accountability to financial-market actors. 
Academic advocates of LBOs argue that such (market-driven) devices are a crucial antidote to 
the aforementioned 'agency problem' that is endemic to the structure of public corporations. In 
providing what is arguably the most well known academic justification of LBOs, the financial 
economist Michael Jensen argued that: 
"By resolving the central weakness of the large public corporation 
- the conflict 
between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate resources 
- 
these new organizations are making remarkable gains in operating efficiency, 
employee productivity, and shareholder value." (Jensen, 1989, p.2) 
Yet LBOs raiseserious concerns that cast doubt on the pretension of private equity to constitute 
a coherent, alternative model of corporate governance for large business finns. 
First, there is the significant concentration of power that private equity governance necessarily 
entails (UK Treasury Committee, 2007). Although the same charge of concentrated power could 
be levelled at the hegemonic managerialist corporation, the fact that residual 'ownership' rights 
in public companies are spread amongst a multitude of minority shareholders vests the process of 
public company governance with a formally (if not substantively) pluralist character. In contrast, 
within private equity-controlled companies there occurs an amalgamation of both managerial and 
proprietary governance rights. Whilst rendering corporate decision-making more akin to 
orthodox entrepreneurial activity in terms of its underlying proprietary motivation, such a re-
alignment of ownership and control nevertheless threatens the basic notion of 'checks and 
balances' that lies at the heart of a liberal democratic political economy by engendering a 
uniquely autonomous form of decision-making power in respect of large-scale corporate 
organisations." If corporate governance is concerned primarily with the proper way to mitigate 
11 On the intrinsic importance of effective corporate accountability mechanisms within the framework of a liberal-
democratic political economy, see Stokes (1994) ; Parkinson (1993). 
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the concentration of power within public (widely-held) companies, it may well be the case that, 
as a medicine to cure this concentration, LBOs are often worst that the putative disease. 
Secondly, there is the issue of private equity's lack of transparency, at least in relation to the 
alternative option of public company governance. By virtue of their de-listed status, private 
equity-controlled firms are exempt from the standard public company practice of preparing 
statutory accounts and reports, together with quarterly earnings reports, for the benefit of (current 
and potential) investors and the general public. This has bred concern as to a possible 
'accountability deficit' within the private equity sector, whereby the activities of firms with high 
socio-economic impact can be effectively 'veiled' from public inspection simply by means of 
removing their securities from the investment marketplace (Thornton, 2007; Walker Working 
Group, 2007; UK Treasury Committee, 2007). In particular, worker unions worry about the 
implications of LBO operations in terms of employee security and welfare, such as where the 
UK motor services firm AA reportedly saw approximately one-third of its workforce made 
redundant as part of a wide-scale restructuring drive initiated following the company's 
acquisition in 2004 by Permira and CVC Capital (Lenikin, 2007; Thornton, 2007). 
Finally, the fact that LBOs are by definition heavily dependent on debt 'leverage' renders their 
continuing operation and success contingent to a significant extent on the maintenance of 
favourable macro-conditions and, in particular, the preservation of low interest rates (Cheffins & 
Armour, 2007; UK FSA, 2006). It is therefore unsurprising to witness a sharp contraction in 
large-scale public-to-private LBO activity as a result of the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and 
ensuing 'credit crunch' on the international debt markets. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this part we have critically assessed two distinctive modes of governance for large business 
firms, which enable them to raise funds on a significant scale from the investing public. These 
two modes are clearly contrasting as to the role played by competitive (stock) markets in the 
control of firms, but they share one common attribute: shareholder sovereignty. In the next part, 
we consider an alternative mode of governance, grounded on the normative perspective 
envisaged by Berle and Means (1932). 
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IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE PUBLIC COMPANY: HOW TO 
EXPLOIT THE SEPARATION 
A. BERLE AND MEANS' NEW CORPORATE ORDER 
The final Book (IV) of Berle and Means' Modern Corporation begins with the following 
passage: 
"The shifting relationships of property and enterprise in American industry.. .raise in 
sharp relief certain legal, economic, and social questions which must now be 
squarely faced. Of these the greatest is the question in whose interests should the 
great quasi-public corporations.. .be operated." (Berle and Means, 1932, p.  294) 
Berle and Means (1932) identified two alternative answers to this question, corresponding to two 
different doctrines: on the one hand, the doctrine of managerial sovereignty; and, on the other, 
that of shareholder sovereignty. The managerial sovereignty doctrine recognizes the 
concentration of power in the hands of managers, observing that it is the result of a strictly 
contractual process: the shareholders have accepted loss of control over the company in 
exchange for greater liquidity (Berle & Means, 1932, p.  251). Consequently, the shareholders 
can no longer legitimately demand control over the company, so that ultimate power of direction 
over the firm rests with managers. Berle and Means (1932) expressed concern about this 
approach on the basis that it gives almost dictatorial power to the managers, whom they 
described as "the new princes" (see supra). This concentration of power, we have argued, also 
raises serious concerns as to the attractiveness of private equity governance by LBO 
partnerships, albeit for somewhat different reasons (on which, see supra). 
Although Berle and Means regarded the shareholder sovereignty doctrine to be a better (or, at the 
very least, a less worse) solution, they were not especially enthused by it either, on the basis that 
it refuses to acknowledge the trade-off between control and liquidity. In addition, they cast doubt 
on the possibility that distant and passive owners might be capable of exercising a sufficient 
degree of control over hegemonic managers. As Tsuk Mitchell (2005, p.188) notes: "Berle and 
Means feared that such rules would have 'the bulk of American industry operated by trustees for 
the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security owners." 
Berle and Means' position concerning the accountability of corporate managers is briefly 
presented in the very last chapter. This chapter begins with a long quotation from Rathenau, 
industrialist, statesman in the Weimar Republic and social theorist, describing the German 
conception of the public limited company in the following terms: "The depersonalization of 
ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from possessor, leads to 
a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institution which resembles the state in 
character" (Berle & Means, 1932, p.  309). Likewise, in the new introduction to the 1967 edition 
of the Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle wrote: "There is an increasingly 
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recognition of the fact that collective operations, and those predominantly conducted by large 
corporations, are like operations carried on by the state itself. Corporations are essentially 
political constructs" (Berle and Means, 1932, p.  xxvi). 
Both quotations shed light on the distinction between two antagonistic logics. According to the 
logic of ownership, the (legal) world is divided between owners (legal persons, whether human 
or non-human) and objects of ownership. The owner of an object has 'subjective' power over 
that object, which means that he has the right (the power) to do whatever he wants with it under 
the law (Robe, 1999). Note that shareholder sovereignty and managerial sovereignty both 
analyse the corporation through this logic: the company is an object of ownership. The difference 
is the identity of the owners. According to the doctrine of shareholder sovereignty, the only 
legitimate owners are the shareholders. Of course, as discussed above, within contractarian logic 
shareholders are, strictly speaking, 'principals' of their managerial 'agents' rather than owners of 
the corporation itself. However, this conceptual technicality does not alter the ultimate positive 
outcome: both proprietary and agency rationality confers upon shareholders subjective power 
over the corporation in the sense of the legal entitlement to demand managerial deference to their 
subjective interest, even if this subjective power is de facto limited by the opportunism of 
corporate executives. The substance of the agency model is similarly unambiguous from a 
normative standpoint: an efficient corporation is a corporation where shareholders are able, 
through a diversity of mechanisms, to impose their subjective interests on managers. 
According to the managerial sovereignty thesis, on the other hand, shareholders' ownership 
powers have been traded off in favour of liquidity, so that managers assume the effective status 
of corporate 'owners' in the sense of having untrammelled discretion over the direction of the 
company's business and the allocation of its assets and cash flows. On a normative level, 
meanwhile, this arrangement is viewed to be legitimate insofar as managers can be trusted to 
exercise their 'unchecked' decision-making power in accordance with the general socio-
economic 'good' as expressed via received public opinion (Dodd, 1932; Berle, 1960). 
In contrast to the above ownership rationality, the logic of institution dictates that the holder of 
power should not be free to exercise it in his interest (subjectively), but, rather, in the interests of 
those affected by it. The reference to the State in Rathenaus and Berle's quotations is significant 
on this level: the distinctive feature of a non-totalitarian State resides in the fact that the 
concentration of power within the State apparatus, necessary for its efficiency, is 
counterbalanced by limits placed on that power. The exercise of power is subjected, by means of 
various procedures, to the will of the people. Hence, the idea defended by Berle and Means is 
that the liquidity of stock markets calls for a rethinking of the nature of power within large 
companies. The finn is no longer an object of property, but an institution that must be governed 
as such. If the corporation is an institution - meaning that subjective interest should not be a 
guideline for the exercise of power - then it is necessary to set limits on managerial power to 
ensure that it is exercised on behalf of the company's constituents: shareholders, certainly, but 
also workers and, even further, the communities in which these companies thrive. The Modern 
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Corporation therefore ends with a plea for management that would be a "purely neutral 
technocracy" (p. 312). Ultimately, whereas the agency perspective seeks to minimize the 
separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means propose to exploit it in order to enhance 
the role of public concern in capitalism through an extended accountability for the managers of 
(American) society's most powerful economic entities 
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE WITHIN EXISTING (US) 
LEGAL DOCTRINE 
It is a widely accepted truism that, whilst continental European jurisdictions do not provide any 
direct support to the shareholder sovereignty model (see, e.g., Jackson and Hopner, 2002 for the 
German case; Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005, for the French case), within Anglo-Saxon legal 
environments the shareholder primacy norm contrarily represents an intrinsic and centrifugal 
norm of corporate governance law and practice (Clark, 1986; Keay, 2007).12 
 On this basis it is 
commonly concluded that, in those instances where the pursuit of 'shareholder value' produces 
negative externalities, 'corrections' should be made not by reforming the structure of corporate 
law itself but, instead, by triggering alternative regulatory mechanisms from areas such as labour, 
tort and environmental law (on this, see Clark (1986), p. 20; Parkinson (1993), pp.  41-42). If 
indeed true this statement suggests that, in spite of the profound influence of their insights on a 
conceptual level, Berle and Means did not actually succeed in either rationalising or influencing 
the practical evolution of (US) corporate law. The present section argues, successively, that: (i) 
US legal doctrine is, as a matter of fact, more closely connected with the institutional perspective 
portrayed by Berle and Means (1932) than the aforementioned 'agency' paradigm; and (ii) that 
new developments in the economic theory of the firm may help to rationalize this arrangement 
normatively. 
The term 'shareholder value' usually denotes, in essence, the corporate managerial norm of 
generating an optimal (or at least relatively high) financial return or profit from a company's 
business for the benefit of its equity-holders. So pervasive is this yardstick as a perceived goal of 
the Anglo-American corporation today that one would be forgiven for regarding the 
maximisation of shareholder value as being a legally sanctioned norm of managerial conduct. 
However, at no point in history in the US (or, for that matter, the UK) have corporate managers 
been under any legal fiduciary duty to generate, on a continuous basis, high financial returns for 
shareholders. If anything, in fact, the dominant strand of common law reasoning on the 
12 
 For example, in what is arguably the leading modem account of the US corporate law system, Harvard Law 
School's Robert Clark explains that, since "it is the shareholders who have the claim on the residual value of the 
enterprise, that is, what's left after all definite obligations are satisfied", it follows that "the managers have an 
affirmative open-ended obligation to increase this residual value." (1986, pp.  17-18). A recent academic account of 
the legal features of UK corporate governance, meanwhile, proceeds on the premise that "[g]enerally speaking, 
Anglo-American corporate law embraces a principle that has been expressed in one of the following ways: 
shareholder primacy, shareholder wealth maximisation or shareholder value." (Keay, 2007, p.  656) 
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relationship between corporate shareholders and the board would appear to operate firmly 
against any such suggestion. 
The idea that a company's board of directors is subject to any sort of direct 'agency' relationship 
with that film's shareholders, requiring ongoing subservience to the latter's expressed interests, 
was dispelled in a line of cases decided by the New York courts over a century ago. In one of the 
earliest and also most emphatic refutations of the so-called 'principal-agent' model of corporate 
governance within the United States, Comstock J of the Court of Appeals of New York stressed 
the fundamental corporate law tenet that: 
"[t]he board of directors of a corporation do not stand in the same relation to the 
corporate body which a private agent holds toward his principal. In the strict 
relation ofprincipal and agent, all the authority of the latter is derived by legislation 
from the former, . .. [b]ut in corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, 
in a very important sense, original and undelegated... in the sense of being received 
from the State in the act of incorporation." 
Moreover, according to Comstock J. 
"The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the affairs of every 
corporation whose powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most 
ordinary business could not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be 
executed." (Hoyt v Thompson's Executor, (1859) 19 N.Y. 207 (Court of Appeals of 
New York), p.  216) 13 
Over half a century later Chase J of the same Court reiterated this basic line of reasoning, 
expressing the principle that "the individual directors making up the board are not mere 
employees, but a part of an elected body of officers constituting the executive agents of the 
corporation." Setting out the parameters of what is today known in corporate law jurisprudence 
as the business judgement rule, Chase J explained that directors "hold such office charged with 
the duty to act for the corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing they cannot 
be controlled in the reasonable exercise and performance of such duty" (People ex rel. Manice v 
Powell, (1911) 201 N.Y. 194 (Court of Appeals of New York), p. 201). 
Underlying all of the above propositions of law is a judicial adherence to the so-called 
'concession' theory of corporate law (on this generally, see Bratton, 1989; Parkinson, 1993, pp. 
25-32). According to this view, a company's charter is vested with the force of law by virtue of 
the act of incorporation alone, with the effect that the particular division of decision-making 
powers established in the charter is regarded as emanating directly from the state as the formal 
grantor of corporate status. It follows that, insofar as a company's charter vests executive 
authority for the running of the business in the hands of that firm's board of directors (as 
13 
 See also Olcoit v Tioga R.R. Co., (1863) 27 N.Y. 546 (Court of Appeals of New York); Charleston Boot & Shoe 
Co. v Dunsmore, (1880) 60 N.H. 85 (New Hampshire Supreme Court). 
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opposed to its shareholders), then the board's discretion over strategic and operational affairs can 
be regarded as sovereign and absolute, subject only to compliance with minimal standards of 
loyalty (i.e. anti-self-dealing) and decision-making rationality (on this doctrine of US corporate 
law, see Bainbridge, 2003). 
Shareholders consequently have no legal power under US (Delaware and New York) corporate 
law to remove directors before expiration of office. Nor do they have the right to give any 
specific or general directions to the board regarding the running of the company, or to initiate 
constitutional amendments aimed at increasing their structural influence over managerial affairs 
(see Bebchuk, 2005). This is because, in the words of Chase J again, "[t]he board of directors 
[and not the general body of shareholders] represent the corporate body", so that 
"recommendations by a body of stockholders can only be enforced through the board of directors 
[itself], and indirectly by the authority of the stockholders to change the personnel of the 
directors at a meeting for the election of directors" (Continental Securities Co. v Belmont (1912) 
206 N.Y. 7 (Court of Appeals of New York), p.  16). For these reasons the US legal model of the 
corporation has recently been described by one scholar in terms of "a purely representative 
democracy" (Bebchuk, 2005, p.  850), in the sense that shareholders, just like the citizens of a 
democratic state, generally have no direct say in the governance of the organisation other than 
the collective right to dismiss those individuals in power (i.e. the board of directors or appointed 
head of state) at the end of the latter's agreed period of office. 
Such an institution- (as opposed to market-) based model of the corporation finds support not 
only in (US) legal doctrine, but also from recent developments in the theory of the firm which 
highlight the economic benefits of a model of corporate governance centred on the role and 
rights of the 'internal' board rather than 'external' shareholder. The 'Tearn Production' model of 
corporate law developed by Blair and Stout (1999) is a notable example of this analytical stance, 
relyihg in particular on advances in human capital theory and incomplete contract (see also 
Gelter, 2008). The argument runs as follows: when contracts are incomplete, protection of 
specific, non-redeployable investments cannot be achieved beforehand by the establishment of a 
contract providing for every possible contingency. Consequently, the parties to the contract are 
led to establish extra-contractual mechanisms which enable them to appropriate a share of the 
organizational quasi-rent as a return on their investment (Williamson, 1985). Further, it is 
increasingly recognized that the quasi-rent created by the firm derives from the pooling of 
complementary resources in the form of tangible, and also intangible, human and financial 
capital. 'Team production' is thus no longer limited just to human resources as portrayed in 
Aichian and Demsetz's (1972) seminal model (see supra, p. j. Rather, it concerns the whole 
set of productive resources used by the firm including, in particular, its important body of 
'intangibles'. Coupled with contractual incompleteness, team production accordingly raises an 
economically crucial question: how can corporate law provide the requisite organizational 
incentives to encourage input providers to specialize their respective resources in line with the 
firm's peculiar production needs? 
Arguably corporate governance and, in particular, the board of directors might be analyzed as a 
specific mechanism designed to provide such an incentive: thus the board should act as an 
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independent third party, whose objective is to serve the collective interest of the corporate 'team' 
as a whole. The directors are no longer simply the agents of the shareholders; their fiduciary 
duties must be exercised, and discretion resolved, in favour of the overall corporate entity. The 
productive resources of the firm must be managed in the interest of the firm itself Accordingly, 
'neutral' board governance might be considered the most appropriate institutional means of 
protecting (and, moreover, enhancing) the firm's overall wealth-generating capacity, at least in 
those instances where value creation is dependent on the efficient combination of specialist, non-
redeployable productive resources. 
In summary US corporate law, based as it is upon a conception of the corporation and its board 
as a mere representative channel for shareholders' democratically and intermittently determined 
will, effectively relegates shareholders to the status of being subject to the corporation and the 
governing mandate of its board of directors. As such, US corporate law is squarely at odds with 
the doctrine of shareholder primacy, which in contrast depends on an assumption of shareholder 
sovereignty in the determination and appropriation of the corporation's economic output on an 
ongoing basis. This suggests that, if the norm of shareholder primacy is indeed prevalent within 
Anglo-American corporate governance, it has become so in spite of, rather than because of, the 
surrounding corporate law framework. The logical deduction is that (stock) market pressures, 
rather than legal norms, are responsible for the promotion of the shareholder to the status of de 
facto primary beneficiary of the corporate production process 14, thus negatively confirming 
agency theory's correctness on a positive level. From a normative standpoint, however, the 
above analysis demonstrates that the principal-agent model, on account of its narrow shareholder 
centricity, largely fails to account for the complex and variable nature of economic input 
provision within dynamic 21st  centuly industries. On the contrary, it has been argued - following 
Blair and Stout (1999) - that complementary and non-redeployable investments of non-financial 
capital can only be effectively protected today under a board-centric governance regime based on 
the principle of managerial neutrality. Interestingly, though, this principle lies at the heart of the 
traditional US model of corporate governance as enshrined in formal legal doctrine. 
C. RE-EQUILIBRATING MANAGERIAL NEUTRALITY 
The above insights establish that the institutional conception of corporate enterprise is already 
inherent in the (US) law as it stands. At the same time, though, managers are encouraged by 
(stock) market-based mechanisms and, in particular, equity-based remuneration devices (e.g. 
stock options), to adopt the 'external' (market-determined) yardstick of shareholder value rather 
than the 'internal' (technocratically-determined) criterion of enterprise value as the primary 
determinant of corporate success. Consequently, the doctrine of shareholder primacy is 
14 
 On this point, see Lazonick & O'Sullivan (2000). 
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informally promoted to the status of central managerial norm, and managers are vested with the 
status of defacto 'agents' of shareholders, despite the apparent politico-economic 'colourness' of 
management within the corporation's formal legal decision-making framework. 
Whilst the phenomenon of stock market control theoretically resolves the problem of managerial 
hegemony within the public corporation by substituting indirect market control for direct 
entrepreneurial oversight, it in practice has often exacerbate the unaccountability of key 
decision-makers by provide covert opportunities for excessive risk-taking and rent extraction 
based on the constantly shifting value of the firm's liquid equities (on this problem generally, see 
Rebérioux, 2007). And, although the market-based institution of private equity offers a potential 
solution to such problems via 're-entrepreneurialization' of the firm's ownership and governance 
structure, as explained above the permanence of large-scale LBOs within the corporate 
governance landscape is significantly inhibited by inert problems of socio-economic power 
concentration and over-dependence on favourable macro-economic conditions. 
There is consequently a lack of any continuous and reliable market-based mechanism for 
'internalizing' the investment horizons of corporate equity investors (and, in turn, managers) in 
line with the productive parameters of the business enterprise rather than the financial parameters 
of the liquid stock market. This highlights the need for regulatory measures aimed at re-
allocating power within the firm's decision-making structures to those groups with a more 
continuous and intimate relationship with the corporate productive enterprise. The motivating 
aim of such a process of legal reform should not be that of reducing the shareholder's 
hierarchical status vis-a-vis other corporate participants (which is already largely achieved by 
company law doctrine), but, rather, of directly empowering non-shareholder groups within the 
firm's decision-making structures so as to re-equilibrate the doctrine of managerial neutrality in 
the face of shareholders' strong (stock) market-base influence over corporate decision-making 
processes. In this way, Berle and Means' conception of the company as a publicly orientated 
institution might be effectively implemented within the present-day corporate governance 
system. 
Of course, the most obvious potential means of restoring managerial neutrality within the 
(financialized) public corporation is through removal of the main legal-institutional bases of 
shareholder primacy, namely executive stock options and shareholders' exclusive periodic rights 
of appointment over corporate directors. The danger with such a proposed reform, though, is that 
any gains to be made in terms of improved managerial responsiveness to enterprise- (as opposed 
to market-) level considerations may be negated by the increased accountability problems which 
would likely result from rendering corporate managers in effect answerable to no particular 
corporate constituency whatsoever (on this general problem, see Berle, 1932). 
As a more effective and also practicable alternative policy, one may consider the re-allocation of 
a proportion of decision-making power to those corporate constituents who are most directly 
affected by the finn's activities, namely its workforce (Hill, 2003). Not only are the company's 
employees the only group of participants who are subject to the firm's authority structure as a 
matter of both economic fact (see Coase, 1937) and formal (labour) law (see supra, p. j; but 
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also they are generally the only group whose 'investment' in the firm takes a relatively long-term 
relational form in the sense that open-ended undertakings of fidelity, obedience and care are 
substituted for promises to supply specific and defined economic 'inputs' (Macneil, 1978; Fox, 
1974).15 Consequently, the ongoing economic welfare of a company's workforce is to a 
considerable extent aligned inextricably with the continuing stability and success of the 
individual firm, thus vesting the employment relationship with a uniquely 'internal' 
constitutional quality that is generally lacking in other 'stakeholder' relations and, above all, in 
the corporate-shareholder relation. This is especially so in those cases where employees have 
made unique and non-redeployable investments in acquiring skills, experience or social 
familiarity within the peculiar context of an individual corporate enterprise, meaning that their 
continuing ability to generate income in excess of the opportunity cost of their labour varies 
directly and intrinsically with that firm's overall enterprise value (on this, see Blair, 1995; Blair 
& Stout, 1999; Kelly & Parkinson, 2000). 
Moreover, in contrast to market equity investors (shareholders), an employee's investment is by 
definition illiquid and hence provides minimal 'exit' protection against the downside risk of lost 
earnings-potential in an insolvent or financially unstable corporation. This suggests that 
employee representatives are prone to engender the formation of more stable and sustainable 
strategic policies on an individual firm basis, thereby counteracting shareholders' inclination to 
promote continual innovation and restructuring aimed at exceeding (on an intra-firm level) the 
variable opportunity cost of their rate of return on equity at macro (stock market-wide) level. 
And, finally, the representation of workers on the board should increase the knowledge used to 
monitor managers and to inform external stakeholders (including shareholders), especially where 
intangibles are a decisive driver of value. This point is supported by empirical evidence provided 
by Fauver and Fuerst (2006), who show that the inclusion of worker representatives on the 
(supervisory) boards of German firms is positively correlated (up to a certain point) with the 
performance of those firms. 
To this end, the participation of employees in corporate decision-making via formal rights to 
information, consultation and (to a limited extent) representation on the board of directors itself 
might be considered, principally as a means of 'constitutionalizing' the workforce as a locus of 
countervailing decision-making power vis-à-vis shareholders and (equity-remunerated) 
managers. The evolving 'European model' of corporate governance provides a vivid example of 
such an arrangement16, and demonstrates the potential for effective (albeit artificial) regulatory 
re-equilibration of managerial autonomy within a modern environment of strong (stock) market- 
15 
 On this legal quality of the Anglo-Saxon employment relation generally (as discussed within a UK context), see 
Deakin & Morris (2005), P.  121. 
' Worker board-level participation in listed companies is provided for by (company or labour) law in almost half of 
the European Union member states (Germany, Austria, Nordic countries and most of the eastern countries), via 
representation on either a unitary board of directors (e.g. Sweden) or 'upper-tier' supervisory board (e.g. Germany). 
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based controls otherwise favouring resolution of managerial discretion exclusively in the 
shareholder interest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The recent series of international financial crises have strengthened the perceived importance of 
ensuring that key corporate decision-makers are held accountable for the socio-economic 
consequences of their actions. Moreover, within a liberal democratic system this is not only an 
economic problem but also one of politics, insofar as the aggregation of quasi-governmental 
power within the private sector threatens the practical capacity of citizens to govern themselves 
in accordance with the rule of law. 
The foregoing analysis has highlighted the limitations of standard economic attempts to 'explain 
away' managers' decision-making power in accordance with a market-based 'agency' model of 
corporate governance, whereby the externally-imposed imperative of deferring to the general 
shareholder interest serves to minimise managers' scope for abuse of office. Not only are stock 
markets considerably limited as a medium for transmitting reliable firm-specific information 
from 'insider' managers to 'outsider' shareholders, but also detached public shareholders' face 
problems in designing effective institutional mechanisms for protection and promotion of their 
interest vis-a-vis hegemonic managers on an ongoing basis. And, whilst the market-induced 
institution of private equity promises an effective opposite response to the accountability deficit 
by means of re-entrepreneurialization of the public company, the influence of LBOs is in reality 
heavily curtailed by a combination of macro-economic factors and public-accountability 
concerns. 
Accordingly, this article's central claim is that, rather than continuing the search for effective 
methods of minimizing the separation of ownership and control within public companies, the 
energies of corporate governance scholars might be better invested in the converse quest of 
finding ways to exploit this separation in order to engender the development of an alternative, 
more effective governance paradigm. In particular, it is submitted that the logic of institution 
embedded in existing legal doctrine and economic theory presents a more appropriate conceptual 
basis on which to elicit future governance reforms than the standard economic logic of the 
competitive market. This is true not only from the progressive viewpoint of encouraging more 
dynamic and sustainable modes of governance at the individual firm level, but also in terms of 
the more conventional challenge of ensuring the effective accountability of the corporate-
managerial sector in general. For this reason, our proposed institutional model of corporate 
governance can be regarded as a 'new-age' solution to an 'age-old' dilemna. 
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